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THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE UPON SOCIETY.

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DURING the past year we have had to mourn the loss of our Patron, King George V, but to rejoice in the honour done us by His Majesty King Edward VIII, himself our most illustrious past President, in taking that office.

Since the beginning of this century the British Association has, till now, added only one new place of meeting in this country to its list. Blackpool can certainly do for science in the North all that Bournemouth achieved in the South : give our record new vigour and itself a new friend.

The reactions of society to science have haunted our presidential addresses with various misgivings for some years past. In his great centenary address General Smuts, answering the question 'What sort of a world picture is science leading to ?' declared that one of the great tasks before the human race is to link up science with ethical values and thus to remove grave dangers threatening our future. For rapid scientific advance confronts a stationary ethical development, and science itself must find its most difficult task in closing a gap which threatens disruption of our civilisation, and must become the most effective drive towards ethical values. In the following year a great Engineer spoke as a disillusioned man, who watched the sweeping pageant of discovery and invention in which he used to take unbounded delight, and concluded by deploring the risk of losing that inestimable blessing, the necessity of toil and the joy of craftsmanship, declaring that spiritual betterment was necessary to balance the world. Then came the President of the Royal Society, a supreme Biochemist, on the perils of a leisure made by science for a world unready for it, and the necessity for planning future adjustment in social reconstructions. Followed the Astronomer, deploring man's lack of moral self-control ; in knowledge man stands on the shoulders of his predecessor, whereas in moral nature they are on the same ground. The wreck of civilisation is to be avoided by more and not by less science. Lastly, the Geologist gloried in the greatest marvel of millions of centuries of development, the brain of man, with a cost in time and energy that shows us to be far from the end of a mighty purpose, and looking forward confidently to that further advance which alone can justify the design and skill lavished on such a task. So the Geologist pleads then

for scientific attention to man's mind. He has the same faith in the permanence of man's mind through the infinite range of years

> 'Which oft hath swept this toiling race of men
> And all its laboured monuments away,'

that is shown at the Grand Canyon, where, at the point exposing, in one single view, over a billion and a half years of the world's geological history, a tablet is put to the memory of Stephen Tyng Mather, the founder of the National Park Service, bearing what is surely the most astonishing scientific expression of faith ever so inscribed:

> 'There will *never come an end* to the good that he has done.'

We have been pleading then in turn for ethical values, for spiritual betterment, for right leisure, for moral advance, and for mental development, to co-ordinate change in man himself with every degree of advance in natural science in such a harmony that we may at last call it Progress. This extension of our deeper concern beyond our main concern is not really new, but it has taken a new direction. I find that exactly one hundred years ago there was a full discussion of the moral aspects, a protest that physical science was not indeed, as many alleged, taking up so much of the attention of the public as to arrest its study of the mind, of literature and the arts; and a round declaration that by rescuing scientists from the narrowness of mind which is the consequence of limiting themselves to the details of a single science, the Association was rendering 'the prevailing taste of the time more subservient to mental culture'. A study of these early addresses shows that we are more diffident to-day in displaying the emotions and ideals by which I do not doubt we are all still really moved. But they also show that we are pre-occupied to-day with some of the results of scientific discovery of which they were certainly then only dimly conscious. A part of that field, which ought itself to become scientific, is my theme to-day.

What do we mean by impact? My subject is *not* the influence or effect of science upon society—too vast, varied and indeterminate for such an occasion. We may consider the position of the average man, along a line of change we call 'progress, at the beginning of a certain interval of time and at its end. We might then analyse how much is due to a change in the average man himself, his innate physical and mental powers, and how much to other influences and particularly to science. We may debate whether the distance covered is great or small by some assumed standard, and whether progress has been rapid. We might ask whether the direction has been right, whether he is happier or better—judged again by some accepted standard. But our concern here is with none of these questions. I ask whether the transition has been difficult and distressing, in painful jerks and uprootings, costly, unwilling, or unjust; or whether it has been easy, natural, and undisturbing. Does society make heavy weather of these changes, or does it, as the policeman would say, 'come quietly'? The attitude of mind of our order may be either that change is an interruption of rest and stability, or that rest and stability are a mere pause in a constant process of change. But these alternatives make all the difference to its accommodating mechanisms. In one case there will be well-developed tentacles, grappling irons, anchorages, and all the apparatus of security. In the other, society will put on casters and roller bearings, cushions, and all the aids to painless transition. The *impact* of science will be surprising and painful in the one case, and smooth and undamaging in the other. Whatever may be the verdict of the past, is society and its institutions now learning that change is to be a continuous function, and that meeting it requires the development of a technique of its own?

Science itself has usually no immediate impact upon institutions, constitutions and philosophies of government and social relations. But its *effects* on people's numbers, location and habits soon have; and the resistance and repugnance shown by these institutions and constitutions to the changed needs may rebound or react through those effects upon scientific enterprise itself and make it more precarious or more difficult. Thus the effect of applications of electricity and transport improvements is clearly to make the original areal extent of city or provincial governments quite inappropriate, and the division of functions and methods of administration archaic. If these resist

change unduly they make it more difficult and frictional, and the applications of science less profitable and less readily acceptable. Time makes ancient good uncouth. When two bodies are violent or ungainly in impact, both may be damaged. If the written constitution of the United States, devised for the 'horse and buggy' days, still proves not to be amenable to adjustment for such demands, it will be difficult to overstate the repercussion upon economic developments and the scientific enterprise that originates them. Let the Supreme Court Decision of unconstitutionality on the Tennessee Valley experiment in large scale applied science to natural problems on a co-ordinated plan bear witness. Such unnecessary resistance may be responsible for much of what has been aptly called 'the frustration of science'. Avoidable friction in the reception given to scientific discovery not only deprives the community of advantages it might otherwise have enjoyed much earlier, or creates a heavy balance of cost on their adoption; it may also discourage applied science itself, making it a less attractive and worthwhile pursuit. In that sense we are considering also the impact of society upon science. This too is not new. The Association had as one of its first objects 'to obtain a more general attention to the objects of Science, and a removal of any disadvantages of a public kind which impede its progress.' The first address ever offered affirmed that the most effectual method of promoting science was the removal of the obstacles opposing its progress, and the President instanced the very serious obstacles in the science of optics due to the regulations relating to the manufacture of glass. To-day perhaps the scientist places more stress upon the failure of governments to encourage, than upon their tendency to discourage. So much then for the *idea* of impact. Is the scientist or inventor responsible for impact, and if not, who is ?

Elsewhere I have retouched Jeremy Bentham's poignant picture of the inventor of over a century ago, plans and cap in hand, on the doorstep of the rich or influential, waiting for someone to believe in him. From this type of external 'sport' amongst engineers and scientists came much or most industrial innovation, external to the process of business. To-day, in the older and applied sciences affecting industry the solo scientist is the exception and, with the large research departments of particular businesses and trade research associations, the picture is quite different—the expenditure higher, but the results much more rapid and numerous even if for a time they may be kept secret. Although records of finished work may be available over the civilised world, there is much overlapping of current work, but the price of this as a whole is a far smaller fraction of the total result, if we omit from our consideration the first magnitude discoveries of epoch-making influence. The industrial community is now far more amenable than hitherto to scientific influence, indeed it is often the instigator in the mass of minor advances. The new epoch of concerted industrial research dates really from the end of the Great War. During all that time I have held some middle position of responsibility between the research laboratories and institutes on the one hand, and the costing and profit and loss accounts on the other, and my impression is that the proportion of work in which the initiation comes from the business end is steadily increasing. In studies of the periods of scientific and industrial gestation respectively, I have elsewhere defined *scientific gestation* as the time elapsing between the first concept of the idea and its public presentation to society in a form substantially that in which it ultimately finds extensive use without important modification; and *industrial gestation* as the period elapsing from this point to the date when in an economic or industrial sense the innovation is effective. Both periods are difficult to determine exactly in practice, but on a broad view, the period of industrial gestation, with which alone I am here concerned, appears to me certainly to have shortened materially, though possibly at greater social cost. It would obviously be so if industry is actively encouraging research. 'Faraday's discoveries came at the beginning of the great steam era, and for fifty years there would have been no difference in transport even if those discoveries had not been made,' for the telegraph was the only material influence upon it, and practical lighting was delayed till 1900.

In nearly every scientific field there is sub-division of labour, and it is rare that the worker who digs out new truth 'at the face,' so to speak, is also responsible for bringing it to the surface for the public use, still less for distributing the new scientific apparatus or ideas broadly, and even less

for the profitable exploitation of the whole process. These functions are nearly always distinct, even though they are embraced under the one general popular description: chemist, engineer, etc. But in few cases is it any part of the professional training in the subject itself, to study how new products or processes affect the structure or welfare of society. I have questioned many scientific workers and find them, of course, keenly alive to the positive and direct beneficial effects of their work, but they have rarely any quantitative ideas as to negative, indirect and disturbing consequences. All these discoveries, these scientific infants, duly born and left on the doorstep of society, get taken in and variously cared for, but on no known principle, and with no directions from the progenitors. Nor do the economists usually acknowledge any duty to study this phase, to indicate any series of tests of their value to society, or even of methods and regulation of the optimum rate of introduction of novelty. These things just 'happen' generally under the urge of profit, and of consumers' desire, in free competition, regardless of the worthiness of new desire against old, or of the shifts of production and, therefore, employment, with their social consequences. The economist rightly studies these when they happen, but he is not dogmatic about them not being allowed to happen at all in just that way on account of the social disturbance or degradation of non-economic values which they may involve. It is surely a 'no-man's land' for it is rarely that the functions of government begin until a vested problem exists. Especially in Britain we do not anticipate—'Don't worry,—it may never happen.' Problems with us are usually called 'academic' until we are 'going down for the third time'. It is a maxim of political expediency not to look too far ahead, for it is declared that one will always provide for the wrong contingency. The national foresight over wireless was exceptional, and it has to be contrasted with the opportunist treatment of the internal combustion engine. In reply, it can, of course, be urged that no one can foresee just how a scientific idea will develop until it is tried out, rough and tumble, in economic society, and to make anticipatory rules may even hinder its development.

It is rightly stated that the training of the scientist includes no awareness of the social consequences of his work, and the training of the statesman and administrator no preparation for the potentiality of rapid scientific advance and drastic adjustment due to it, no provision of the technical forces which are shaping the society in which he lives. The crucial impact is nobody's business.

When the research worker lifts his attention from his immediate pursuit and contemplates its hinterland, he has three possible areas of thought. He may dwell upon its practical applications and seek to make them as immediate and realistic as possible; moved by the desire not to be merely academic, he may return to his task, to focus his attention primarily on what is likely to be of practical utility, rather than on what is intellectually intriguing. Or he may think of its ultimate social consequences, and speculate on the shifts in demand, the unemployment, the loss of capital, the ultimate raising of the standard of life that may result—in other words, he may engage in economic prevision and social and political planning for the results of his efforts. Or in the third place, he may listen and watch for hints from other fields of scientific study which may react upon his own, and suggest or solve his problems. I do not attempt to give these priority. Economic and political prevision is the most difficult and precarious, because it needs a technique different from his own, and is not given by the light of nature. Specialist scientists have no particular gifts for understanding the institutional processes of social life and the psychology of multiple and mass decisions. It is a tortuous and baffling art to transmute their exact findings into the wills and lives of unscientific millions. But quite a number engage in the pursuit and have not much greater aptitude as amateur ministers of foresight than statesmen would have in planning research. Fewer are skilled, however, in what should be the most appropriate auxiliary to their work—the synthesising of scientific knowledge. The more penetrating they are in their main pursuits, the less may they absorb through analogy or plain intimation from outside. We constantly hear that the average clinical application lags much farther behind the new resources of diagnosis from the laboratory than circumstances compel. But it may be the other way round. The strongest hint of the presence of a particular factor—a positive element in

beri-beri—was given by the clinician to the bio-chemist, who relied entirely on the *absence* of a particular factor, a negative element, no less than fifteen years before the bio-chemist took serious notice, looked for it, and found it. Bacteriology and chemistry await the advance of the bio-chemist before they come effectively to each other's assistance. The cause and prevention of the obstinate degree of maternal mortality are objects pursued *ad hoc*, with hardly a casual glance at the direct appeal of the eugenist to observe the natural consequences of an improvement in female infant mortality two decades earlier.

I do not then pretend to dogmatise as to how far the scientist should become a social reformer. One physicist welcomes the growing sense of social responsibility, among some scientists at least, for the world the labours of their order have so largely created, though he deplores that in this field they are still utterly unscientific. Then another great authority, Sir Henry Dale, declares that it is the scientists' job to develop their science without consideration of the social uses to which their work might be put.

I have long watched the processes by which the scientific specialist 'makes up his mind' in fields of enquiry outside his own. It seems still a matter for investigation whether the development of a specialist's thinking on balance impairs or improves the powers of general thinking compared with what they might otherwise have been. We do not know the kind or degree of truth that may rest in Anatole France's aphorism: 'The worst of science is, it stops you thinking.' Perhaps this was more subtly expressed in the simpler words of the darkie mother: 'If you haven't an education, you 've jest *got* to use yoh brains.'

My own experience is that when the attempt to deal with social consequences is made, we quickly find ourselves either in the field of larger politics debating the merits of the three prevalent forms of state government, or else performing miracles with fancy currencies and their blue prints reminiscent of the chemical engineer.

But there are some essential features of the impact which must be dealt with under any form of society and government and with any machinery for regulating values. They involve man's abilities, his affections and his tools, all of which have been brusquely treated in the past, and might be scientifically treated in the future. An industrial civilisation is unthinkable without division and, therefore, specialisation, of labour, and without tools and capital instruments. Then life itself is not much worth living without social ties and the allegiances of place and kin. These three indispensable elements of the good life bring out defensive mechanisms for their protection. No one likes to see a man highly trained for a special service or specially fitted by natural aptitudes cut off from opportunity to use his powers and reduced to the level of an unskilled biped. No one likes to see the results of abstinence and specially directed labour which is embodied in a great machine or factory rendered impotent long before it has given its life's usefulness. Waste of skill and of capital are alike grave faults by which we should judge and condemn an industrial organisation. And since man does not live by bread alone, if a ruthless industrial organisation continually tears up the family from its roots, transferring it without choice, to new surroundings, destroying the ties of kin, home and social life, of educational and recreational environments, it is far from ideal. Human labour can never be indefinitely fluid and transferable in a society that has a soul above consumption of mere commodities. These three obstructions to change are not final and rigid limitations upon it. Men die, their skill and home associations with them. Plant and equipment wear out. Their successor presents a natural opportunity in each of the three cases for the introduction of change in position, in aptitude, in purpose or design, without waste or human distress. The length of working life and the durability of materials mark the natural phase or periodicity of a smoothly changing society—its quanta, so to speak. But the impetus for change or the irritant has no such intervals. It proceeds from various causes: varying harvests, changes in natural forces; changing human desires and fashions; differences in the rate of growth of population in its different parts; the collective psychological errors of optimism and pessimism in business in an individualistic society; variations in gold supplies and credit policies based thereon. All or any of these, without

invoking any disturbances from the impact of scientific discovery, would serve to make adjustments necessary outside the natural phases to which I have referred, in a society with parts that are interdependent through division of labour, and localisation of industry, joined by foreign trade and convenient transport. These alone would bring about a changing world with incomplete adaptations, loss of capital, and so-called frictional unemployment. It is easy to exaggerate the adjustment necessary for the addition of invention and science to these causes of change. But with the intensification of scientific effort, and the greater subdivision of industry, the possible dislocation becomes more frequent and the ways of meeting such change of greater public importance. This field of inquiry includes widely diverse questions, *e.g.*, patent laws, invention clearing, obsolescence accountancy and costing regulation, taxation adjustments, local rating pooling, trade union regulations, price controls, technical education, age and other discriminations in unemployment relief, transfer bonuses, pension rights, housing facilities, and more selective direction of financial support of intensive scientific research. In this neutral field the specialist scientist and the politician are both amateurs. It is to be covered by each extending his studies, and by specialists who treat impact and change as an area of scientific study.

I do not propose to go over all the ground, so old, so constantly renewed, as to the effect of machinery upon employment. It is known as an historical induction that in the long run, it makes more employment than it destroys, in providing work in making the machinery, in reducing price so that far greater quantities of the commodity concerned may be consumed, and in enabling purchasing power to be diverted to increase other productions. It has even facilitated the creation of a larger population, which in turn has provided the new markets to work off the additional potentiality of the machinery. It does all this in 'the long run,' but man has to live in the short run, and at any given moment there may be such an aggregation of unadjusted 'short runs' as to amount to a real social hardship. Moreover, it comes in this generation to a people made self-conscious by statistical data repeated widespread at frequent intervals, and to a people socially much more sensitive to all individual hardship and vicissitude which is brought about by communal advance.

There are two important aspects of the change induced by science which are insufficiently realised, and which makes a profound difference to the direction of thought and inquiry. The first I will call the 'balance of innovation' and the second the 'safety valve' of population.

The changes brought by science in economic life may be broadly classified as the 'work creators' and the 'work savers'. The latter save time, work and money by enabling the existing supply of particular commodities to be produced more easily, and therefore at lower cost, and finally at lower prices. People can spend as much money as before upon them and get larger quantities or they can continue to buy their existing requirements at a lower cost. In this second event they 'save money' and their purchasing power is released for other purposes. By a parallel process, producing or labouring power is released through unemployment. The released working force and released purchasing power can come together again in an *increased* demand for other products which, to this extent, have not been hitherto within effective demand. The supply of this increase may go part or all of the way to absorb the displaced labour. But this process takes time, and the labour displaced is not at once of the right kind nor in the right place. More important, however, is the invention of quite new objects of public demand, which may be desired in addition to the supply of old ones. This brings together released labour and released purchasing power in the most decisive way. The most orderly and least disturbing phases of progress will be found when these two types of innovation are reasonably balanced. Of course, few new objects of purchasing ambition are entirely additive; most of them displace some other existing supplies. Artificial silk displaces some cotton consumption, radio may displace some types of musical instruments. Recently the German production of pianos and guitars has been at a very low percentage of capacity, and part of this has been made good by the demand for radio sets. The dislocations caused by labour-saving machinery can most easily be made

good by a due *balance* of new labour creating commodities.

A natural increase of population is the best shock absorber that the community can possess, especially if accompanied by an extension of territory such as the United States enjoyed in the constant westward movement of the frontier in the nineteenth century, or Britain in the period of overseas emigration. A moment's reflection will show why this is the case. Assume that 1,000,000 units of a commodity are made by 100,000 men, and that there is an increase of population of 2 per cent. per annum, so that in five years 1,100,000 units will be consumed and employ 110,000 men. Now assume the introduction of a new invention which enables 1,100,000 units to be made by 100,000 men. There will be no displacement of existing labour, but only a redirection of new and potential labour from that industry to other fields. Again, a considerable reduction in demand *per head* can be sustained without dislocation, if the actual aggregate of production demanded is maintained by increasing numbers. The affected industry can remain static and need not become derelict. New entrants to industry will be directed to those points where purchasing power, released through labour-saving devices, is creating new opportunity with new products. New capital is also naturally directed into the new channels, instead of into additions to the old industry.

Now the problem before all western industrial countries is the fact that their populations are shortly becoming stationary (and then will begin to decline noticeably) and this safety valve of increasing population will no longer be available. Every transfer of *per capita* purchasing power to new directions must then be a definite deduction from the old directions, no longer made good by the steady increase in the numbers demanding less per head from those old sources. The impact of science upon a stationary population is likely, *ceteris paribus*, to be much more severely felt than upon a growing population, because the changes of direction cannot be absorbed by the newly directed workers. Of course, the effects of a static population can be mitigated if the *per capita* income is increasing, because a new direction of demand can be satisfied out of the additional purchasing power without disturbing the original directions of demand provided by the original purchasing power. But the change from a growing to a static or declining population is only one type of difficulty. While the aggregate is altering but slowly, the parts may be changing rapidly. Thus, in this country 40·4 millions in 1937 becomes 40·6 in 1942, 40 in 1947, 39·8 millions in 1952, 38·9 in 1957 and 37·5 in 1962. But the children aged 16—which I take because of its influence on schools, teaching and industrial entry—have been estimated, taking those in 1937 as 100, to be 85 in 1942, 73 in 1952 and 62 in 1962. A fall of this magnitude means that industries and institutions dependent upon the present numbers must not be merely static but actually regressive. On the other hand, the old people from 65 to 74 will increase in this ratio—100, 113, 127 and 133. These problems of static populations at home are accentuated by the possibility of a similar tendency abroad, and need thought in advance. The Australian farmer is more affected by the British conditions of population than by his own.

We have thus the first difficulty, that of a static total demand, the second, that the safety valve of new industrial entrants is becoming smaller, but a third difficulty comes from the present tendency of that class. A stationary elderly population must be very inflexible to change, but a stream of new young life, even if it is to be smaller, would give the opportunity for just that change of direction, in training and mobility, which society needs. But unfortunately, in practice this does not now seem to be very adaptable. For we learn from certain Unemployment Insurance areas that while the older people will willingly take jobs at wages a few shillings in excess of the unemployment relief, the younger men are more difficult. For every one that will accept training under good conditions to suit them for eligible work, ten may refuse, and the number who will not go any distance to take work at good wages is also in excess of those who do. Attachment to place for older people is understandable, and has been accentuated by housing difficulties—one learns of miners unemployed in a village where the prospects of the pit reopening are negligible, while at the same time, only twenty miles away new miners are being created by attraction from agriculture to more extended workings in their area. The very social machinery which is set up to facilitate change or to

soften dislocation, aggravates the evil. The first two difficulties are unalterable. This third difficulty is a subject for scientific examination.

So much for the effect of change of any kind upon employment. Now let us narrow this to scientific changes. At any given moment the impact of science is always causing some unemployment, but at the same time the constructive additional employment following upon past expired impacts is being enjoyed. But it is easy to exaggerate the amount of the balance of net technological unemployment. For industrial disequilibrium arises in many ways, having nothing whatever to do with science. Changes of fashion, exhaustion of resources, differential growth in population, changing customs and tariffs, the psychological booms and depressions of trade through monetary and other causes, all disturb equilibrium, and therefore, contract and expand employment in particular places. Our analytical knowledge of unemployment is bringing home the fact that, like capital accumulation, it is the result of many forces. A recent official report indicated that a quite unexpected amount or percentage of unemployment would be present even in boom times. We know already that there may be a shortage of required labour in a district where there is an 8 or 10 per cent. figure of unemployment. So, in this country there may well be a million unemployed in what we should call good times—it is part of the price we pay for the high standard of life secured by those who retain employment. For a level of real wage may be high enough to prevent every one being employable at that wage—though that is by no means the whole economic story of unemployment. Of this number probably 200,000 would be practically unemployable on any ordinary basis—the 'hard core' as it is called. Perhaps seven or eight hundred thousand from the perpetual body, changing incessantly as to its unit composition, and consisting of workers undergoing transition from job to job, from place to place, from industry to industry, with seasonal occupations—the elements of 'frictional' unemployment through different causes. Out of this number, I should hazard that not more than 250,000 would be unemployed through the particular disturbing element of net scientific innovation. This is the maximum charge that should be laid at the door of science, except in special times, such as after a war, when the ordinary application of new scientific ideas day by day has been delayed, and all the postponed changes tend to come with a rush. At any given moment, of course, the technological unemployment that could be computed from the potentiality of new processes over displaced ones, appears to be much greater. But such figures are *gross*, and from them must be deducted all recent employment in producing new things or larger production of old things, due to science. If we are presenting science with part of the responsible account of frictional unemployment at any moment, it will be the total technological reduction due to new processes and displacement due to altered directions of demand, less the total new employment created by new objects of demand. This has to be remembered when we are being frightened by the new machine that does with one man what formerly engaged ten. Perhaps birth-control for people demands ultimately birth-control for their impedimenta.

The rate of introduction of new methods and the consequent impact upon employment may depend upon the size and character of the business unit. If all the producing plants for a particular market are under one control, or under a co-ordinated arrangement, the rate of introduction of a new labour-saving device will be governed by a simple consideration. It can be introduced with each renewal programme for each replacement of an obsolete unit, and therefore without waste of capital through premature obsolescence. But this applies only to small advantages. If the advantages are large, the difference in working costs for a given production between the old and the new types may be so considerable that it will meet not only all charges for the new capital but also amortize the wasted life of the assets displaced before they are worn out. In neither case then is there any waste of capital, and the absorption of the new idea is orderly in time. But it is quite otherwise if the units are in different ownerships. Excess capacity can quickly result from new ideas. A new ship or hotel or vehicle with the latest attractions of scientific invention, quite marginal in their character, may obtain the bulk of the custom, and render half empty and, therefore, half obsolete, a unit built only a year before. The old unit has to compete by lower prices, and make smaller profits. The newer unit is called upon to bear no

burdens in aid of the reduced capital values of the old. It may be that the enhanced profits of the one added to the reduced profits of the other make an average return upon capital not far different from the average that would result in a community where orderly introduction on a renewal basis is the rule. Or perhaps the community gets some of its novelties rather earlier under competitive conditions and pays a higher rate of interest for them as a net cover for the risks of obsolescence. Waste of capital would be at a minimum if the 'physical' life before wearing out were as short as the 'social' life of the machine. To make a thing so well that it will last 'for ever' is nothing to boast about if it will be out of fashion in a few years.

Scientists often look at the problem of practical application as if getting it as rapidly as possible were the only factor to be considered in social advantage, and this difference in the position of monopoly or single management in their ability to 'hold up' new ideas is treated as a frustration in itself. Thus it has been said 'the danger of obsolescence is a great preventative of fundamental applications to science. Large firms tend to be excessively rigid in the structures of production.' Supposing that the obsolescence in question is a real factor of cost, it would fall to be reckoned with in the computation for transition, whatever the form of society, and even if the personal 'profit' incentive were inoperative. It cannot be spirited away. A customary or compulsory loading of costs for short life obsolescence would retard uneconomically rapid competition of novelties and could be scientifically explored.

Now let us look at displaced labour and the costs of it. If the effect of diversion of demand through invention is to reduce the scope or output of particular industries or concerns in private management, they have no option but to reduce staff. If the pressure is not too great, or the change too rapid, this does not necessarily result in dismissals, for the contraction of numbers may be made by not filling up, with young people, the vacancies caused by natural wastage, through death and retirement. But where dismissals are inevitable, re-engagements may take place quickly in the competing industries, otherwise unemployment ensues. Any resulting burden does not fall upon the contracting and unprofitable industry—it has troubles enough of its own already. Nor is it put upon the new and rising industry, which is attracting to itself the transferred profits. In the abstract, it might be deemed proper that before the net gains of such an industry are computed or enjoyed it should bear the burdens of the social dislocation it causes by its intrusion into society. In practice, it would be difficult to assess its liability under this head, and in fact even if it could be determined, new industries have so many pioneer efforts and losses, so many failures, so many superseded beginnings, that it might well be bad social policy to put this burden upon them, for they would be dicouraged from starting at all, if they had to face the prospect of such an overhead cost whatever their results. It would, of course, be theoretically possible to put a special levy on those new industries that turned out to be profitable, and to use it to relieve the social charges of dislocation of labour. But much the same argument could be used for the relief of obsoletism of capital. The distinction would, however, be that in the case of the capital it could be urged that the investor should have been wide enough awake to see the possibilities of the rival, whereas the worker, induced to take up employment in such a superseded industry, was a victim, and could not be expected to avoid it by prevision. In any case, the prevailing sentiment is rather to encourage developing industries, than to put special burdens upon them, in order that the fruits of science may be effectively enjoyed by society with as little delay as possible.

In the upshot, therefore, the injuries to labour, though not to capital, are regarded as equitably a charge to be borne by society in general through taxation, and to be put upon neither the causing nor the suffering business unit.

And it may well be assmed that taken throughout, the gains of society as a whole from the rapid advance are ample enough to cover a charge for consequential damages. But society is not consciously doing anything to regulate the rate of change to an optimum point in the net balance between gain and damage.

The willingness of society to accept this burden is probably mainly due to the

difficulty of fairly placing it, for we find that when it *can* actually be isolated and the community happens fortuitously to have a control, or the workers a power to induce, it will be thrown, not upon the attacking industry, if I may so call it, but upon the defender. Thus in the United States recently, the price of consent to co-ordinating schemes made for the railroads to reduce operating expenses, has been an agreement on this very point. If staff is dismissed, as it was on a large scale in the depression, because of fewer operations and less stock in consequence of reduced carriage through the smaller volume of trade, or through road and sea competition, no attempt is made to put any of the social cost upon the railroads, and the dismissed staff become part of the general unemployed. But if the self-defence of the companies against competition takes the form of co-operation with each other to reduce operations and stock and, therefore, costs, any resultant dismissals are made a first charge upon them. The agreement is elaborate, and has the effect of preventing any adjustments which an ordinary business might readily make when it throws the burden on society, unless those adjustments yield a margin of advantage large enough to pay for their particular special effects. Thus the rapidity of adjustment to new conditions, not to meet the case of higher profits to be made at the expense of workers, but rather to obviate losses through new competition, is materially affected, and a brake is put upon the mechanism of equilibrium in this industry which does not exist in its rivals, or in any others where the power exists to throw it upon the community. A similar provision exists in the Argentine, and it is imposed by Act of Parliament in Canada, but as one of the concerns is nationally owned, and the current losses fall upon the national budget, its charge is really socially borne in the end. In this country such provisions were part of the amalgamation project of 1923, and of the formation of a single transport authority in London in 1933 and, therefore, did not arise through steps taken to meet new factors of competition. But the opportunity for their imposition came when rights to road powers and rights to pooling arrangements were sought by the railways —both of them adjusting mechanisms to minimise the losses due to the impact of new invention—and this was clearly a specialised case of keeping the burdens off the society. In the case of the electricity supply amalgamation of 1933, brought about for positive advantages rather than in defence against competition, similar provision was made, and parliamentary powers for transfers to gas and water undertakings, also not defensive against innovation, have been accompanied by this obligation. In the case of such uncontrolled businesses as Imperial Chemicals and Shell Mex, rationalising to secure greater profits, rather than fighting rearguard actions to prevent losses, obligations to deal with redundancies had been voluntarily assumed. In such cases the public obloquy of big business operations inimical to society can be a negative inducement, but some freedom from radical competition in prices provide a positive power to assume the burden initially, and pass it forward through price to consumers, rather than back against shareholders. The third case, however, of making it a net charge on the improved profits, is quite an adequate outlet. If the principle of putting this particular obstacle in the way of adjustments to meet new competition (as distinct from increasing profits) is socially and ethically correct, it is doubtful whether it is wisely confined to cases where there is quite fortuitously a strategic control by public will.

It will be clear that the difference between the introduction by purely competitive elements involving premature obsolescence and unemployment, and by delayed action, is a cost to society for a greater promptness of accessibility to novelty. The two elements of capital and labour put out of action, would have supplied society with an extra quantity of existing classes of goods, but society prefers to forego that for the privilege of an earlier anticipation of new things. I estimate this price to be of the order of three per cent. of the annual national income. But when we speak of social advantage on balance, outweighing social cost, we dare not be so simple in practice. If the aggregate individual advantage of adopting some novelty is $100x$ and the social cost in sustaining the consequential unemployed is $90x$, it does not follow that it is a justifiable bargain for society. The money cost is based on an economic minimum for important reasons of social repercussions. But the moral effects of unemployment upon the character and happiness of the individual

escape this equation altogether, and are so great that we must pause upon the figures. What shall it profit a civilisation if it gain the whole world of innovation and its victims lose their souls ?

So far I have treated the problem of innovation as one of uneconomic rapidity. But there is another side—that of improvident tardiness. Enormous potentialities are seen by scientists waiting for adoption for human benefit, under a form of society quicker to realise their advantage, readier to raise the capital required, readier to pay any price for dislocation and to adjust the framework of society accordingly. A formidable list of these potentialities can be prepared and there is little doubt that with a mentality adjusted for change, society could advance much more rapidly. But there is a real distinction between the methods of adopting whatever it is decided to adopt, and the larger question of a more thoroughgoing adoption. In proportion as we can improve the impact of the present amount of innovation, we can face the problem of a larger amount or faster rate. Unless most scientific discoveries happen to come within the scope of the profit motive, and it is worth some one's while to supply them to the community, or unless the community can be made sufficiently scientifically minded to include this particular demand among their general commercial demands, or in substitution for others, nothing happens—the potential never becomes actual. It has been computed that a benevolent dictator could at a relatively small expense, by applying our modern knowledge of diet, add some two inches to the average stature and seven or eight pounds to the average weight of the general population, besides enormously increasing their resistance to disease. But dictators have disadvantages and most people prefer to govern their own lives indifferently, rather than to be ideal mammals under orders. To raise their own standard of scientific appreciation of facts is the better course, if it is not utopian. It has been clear for long enough that a diversion of part of the average family budget expenditure from alcohol to milk would be of great advantage. But it has not happened. If the individual realised the fact, it certainly might happen. It is ironically remarked that the giving of free milk to necessitous children, with all the net social gain that it may bring about, has not been a considered social action for its own sake, but only the by-product emergency of commercial pressure —not done at the instance of the Ministry of Health or the Board of Education, but to please the Milk Marketing Board by reducing the surplus stocks of milk in the interests of the producer !

Scientists see very clearly how, if politicians were more intelligent, if business men were more disinterested and had more social responsibility, if governments were more fearless, far-sighted, and flexible, our knowledge could be more fully and quickly used to the great advantage of the standard of life and health—the long lag could be avoided, and we should work for social ends. It means, says Mr. Julian Huxley, 'the replacement of the present socially irresponsible financial control by socially responsible planning bodies.' Also, it obviously involves very considerable alterations in the structure and objectives of society, and in the occupations and pre-occupations of its individuals. Now a careful study of the literature of planning shows that it deals mainly with planning the known, and hardly at all with planning for changes in the known. Although it contemplates 'planned' research, it does not generally provide for introducing the results of new research into the plan, and for dealing with the actual *impact*—the unemployment, redirection of skill, and location, and the breaking of sentimental ties that distinguish men from robots. It seems to have not many more expedients for this human problem than our quasi-individualist society with its alleged irresponsibility. It also tends to assume that we can tell in advance what will succeed in public demand and what will be superseded. There is nothing more difficult, and the attempt to judge correctly under the intellectual stimulus of high profits and risk of great losses is at least as likely to succeed as the less personally vital decision on a committee. Would a planning committee, for example, planning a new hotel in 1904, have known any better than capitalist prevision that the fifteen bathrooms then considered adequate for social demand, ought really to have been ten times that number if the hotel was not to be considered obsolete thirty years later ? Prevision thought of in terms of hindsight is easy, and few scientists have enjoyed the responsibility of making practical decisions as to what the public will want far ahead. They, therefore, tend to think of prevision

in terms of knowledge and appreciation of particular scientific possibilities, whereas it involves unknown demand schedules, the unceasing baffling principle of substitution, the inertia of institutions, the crusts of tradition and the queer incalculability of mass mind. Of course, in a world where people go where they are told, when they are told, do what they are instructed to do, accept the reward they are allotted, consume what is provided for them, and what is manifestly so scientifically 'good for them' these difficulties need not arise. The human problem will then be the 'Impact of Planning'. I am not here examining the economics of planning as such, but only indicating that it does not provide automatically the secret of correct prevision in scientific innovation. When correct prevision is possible a committee can aim at planning with a minimum disturbance and wastage (and has the advantage over individuals acting competitively), but for such innovation as proves to be necessary it does not obviate the human disturbance or radically change its character. The parts of human life are co-ordinated and some are more capable of quick alteration than others, while all are mutually involved. One may consider the analogy of a railway system which has evolved, partly empirically and partly consciously, as a co-ordinated whole. Suddenly the customary speed is radically changed, and then it may be that all the factors are inappropriate—distance between signals, braking power, radius of curves, camber or super-elevation, angles of crossings, bridge stresses. The harmony has been destroyed. Especially may this be the case if the new factor applies to some units only, and not to all, when the potential density of traffic may be actually lessened. The analogy for the social system is obvious and its form of government matters little for the presence of the problem, though it may be important in the handling of it.

I have spoken as though the normal span of life of men and machinery themselves provides a phase to which scientific advance might be adjusted for a completely smooth social advance. But this would be to ignore customs and institutions, even as we see in Federal America, Australia and Canada, constitutions which lengthen that phase and make it less amenable as a natural transition. At one time we relied on these to bring about the economic adjustment necessary. But technical changes take place so rapidly that such forces work far too slowly to make the required adaptation. Habits and customs are too resistant to change in most national societies to bring about radical institutional changes with rapidity, and we patch with new institutions and rules to alleviate the effects rather than remove the causes of maladjustments. The twenty mile speed limit long outstayed its fitness, and old building restrictions remained to hamper progress. Edison is reported to have said that it takes twenty-five years to get an idea into the American mind. The Webbs have given me a model period of nineteen years from the time when an idea comes up as a practical proposition from a 'dangerous' left wing to the date when it is effectively enacted by the moderate or 'safe' progressive party. This period of political gestation may be a function of human psychology or of social structure. We do not know how ideas from a point of entry, permeate, infiltrate or saturate society, following the analogues of conduction, convection, or lines of magnetic force.

Our attitude of mind is still to regard change as the exceptional, and rest as the normal. This comes from centuries of tradition and experience, which have given us a tradition that each generation will substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its fathers, and transmit those conditions to the succeeding generation. As Whitehead says: 'we are living in the first period of human history for which this assumption is false.' As the time span of important change was considerably longer than that of a single human life, we enjoyed the illusion of fixed conditions. Now the time span is much shorter, and we must learn to experience change ourselves.

I have so far discussed modification of impact to meet the nature of man. Now we must consider modifying the nature of man to meet impact.

Sociologists refer to our 'cultural lags' when some of the phases of our social life change more quickly than others and thus get out of gear and cause maladjustments. Not sufficient harm is done to strike the imagination when the change is a slow one, and all the contexts of law, ethics, economic relations and educational ideals tend towards harmony and co-ordination. We can even tolerate by our conventions, gaps between

them when preachers and publicists can derive certain amusement and profit from pointing out our inconsistencies. But when things are moving very rapidly, these lags become important; the concepts of theology and ethics, the tradition of the law, all tend to lag seriously behind changes brought about through science, technical affairs and general economic life. Some hold that part of our present derangement is due to the lack of harmony between these different phases—the law and governmental forms constitutionally clearly lag behind even economic developments as impulsed by scientific discovery. An acute American observer has said that 'the causes of the greatest economic evils of to-day are to be found in the recent great multiplication of interferences by Government with the functioning of the markets, under the influence of antiquated doctrines growing out of conditions of far more primitive economic life.' It would be, perhaps, truer to say that we are becoming 'stability conscious' and setting greater store, on humanitarian grounds, by the evil effects of instability.

In the United States it would be difficult to find, except theoretically in the President, any actual person, or instrument in the Constitution, having any responsibility for looking at the picture of the country as a whole, and there is certainly none for making a co-ordinated plan. Indeed, in democracy, it is difficult to conceive it, because the man in public life is under continual pressure of particular groups, and so long as he has his electoral position to consider, he cannot put the general picture of progress in the foreground. Whitehead declared that when an adequate routine, the aim of every social system, is established, intelligence vanishes and the system is maintained by a co-ordination of conditioned reflexes. Specialised training alone is necessary. No one, from President to miner, need understand the system as a whole.

The price of pace is peace. Man must move by stages in which he enjoys for a space a settled idea, and thus there must always be something which is rather delayed in its introduction, and the source of sectional scientific scorn. If every day is 'moving' day, man must live in a constant muddle, and create that very fidget and unrest of mind which is the negation of happiness. Always 'jam to-morrow'—the to-morrow that 'never comes'. If we must have quanta on stages, the question is their optimum length and character, not merely the regulation of industry and innovation to their tempo, but the education of man and society to pulse in the same rhythmic wave-length or its harmonic.

In some ways we are so obsessed with the delight and advantage of discovery of new things that we have no proportionate regard for the problems of arrangement and absorption of the things discovered. We are like a contractor who has too many men bringing materials on to the site, and not enough men to erect the buildings with them. In other words, if a wise central direction were properly allocating research workers to the greatest marginal advantage, it would make some important transfers. There is not too much being devoted to research in physics and chemistry, as modifying industry, but there is too much relatively to the research upon the things they affect, in physiology, psychology, economics, sociology. We have not begun to secure an optimum balance. Additional financial resources should be applied more to the biological and human sciences than to the applied physical sciences, or possibly, if resources are limited, a transfer ought to be made from one to the other.

Apart from the superior tone sometimes adopted by 'pure science' towards its own applications, scientific snobbery extends to poor relations. Many of the hard-boiled experimental scientists in the older and so productive fields, look askance at the newer borderline sciences of genetics, eugenics and human heredity, psychology, education and sociology, the terrain of so much serious work but also the happy hunting ground of 'viewey' cranks and faddists. Here the academic soloist is still essential, and he has no great context of concerted work into which to fit his own. But unless progress is made in these fields which is comparable with the golden ages of discovery in physics and chemistry, we are producing progressively more problems for society than we are solving. A committee of population experts has recently found that the expenditure on the natural sciences is some eight to ten times greater than that on social sciences. There is hardly any money at all available for

their programme of research into the immense and vital problems of population in all its qualitative and quantitative bearings. An attack all along the front from politics and education to genetics and human heredity is long overdue. Leisure itself is an almost unexplored field scientifically. For we cannot depend wholly on a hit and miss process of personal adaptation, great though this may be. There must be optimal lines of change which are scientifically determinable. We have seen in a few years that the human or social temperament has a much wider range of tolerance than we had supposed. We can take several popular examples. The reaction to altered speed is prominent. In the *Creevey Papers*, it is recorded that the Knowsley party accomplished 23 miles per hour on the railway, and recorded it as 'frightful—impossible to divest yourself of the notion of instant death—it gave me a headache which has not left me yet—some damnable thing must come of it. I am glad to have seen this miracle, but quite satisfied with my first achievement being my last.' In the British Association meeting for 1836, an address on Railway Speeds prophesied that some day 50 miles an hour might be possible. Forty years ago, we may remember that a cyclist doing 15 to 18 miles an hour was a 'scorcher' and a public danger Twenty-five years ago, 30 miles an hour in motoring was an almost unhealthy and hardly bearable pace. To-day the fifties and sixties are easily borne, both by passenger and looker on. Aeroplane speeds are differently judged, but at any rate represent an extension of the tolerance. Direct taxation thirty years ago in relation to its effect on individual effort and action seemed to reach a breaking-point and was regarded as psychologically unbearable at levels which to-day are merely amusing. The copious protection of women's dress then would have looked upon to-day's rationality as suicidal lunacy. One hesitates to say, therefore, that resistances to scientific changes will be primarily in the difficulty of mental and physical adjustments. But there can be little doubt that with the right applications of experimental psychology and adjusted education, the mind of man would be still more adaptable. Unfortunately, we do not know whether education as an acquired characteristic is in any degree inheritable, and whether increasing educability of the mass is a mere dream, so that we are committed to a sisyphean task in each generation. Nor do we know whether this aspect is affected by the induced sterility of the age. It may not be a problem of changing the same man in his lifetime, but of making a larger difference between father and son. The latest teachings of geneticists hold out prospects for the future of man which we should like to find within our present grasp, and recent successful experiments with mammals in parthenogenesis and eutelegenesis bear some inscrutable expression which may be either the assurance of new hope for mankind or a devil's grin of decadence.

What is economics doing in this kaleidoscope?

The body of doctrine which was a satisfactory analysis of society twenty-five years ago is no longer adequate, for its basic postulates are being rapidly changed. It confined itself then to the actual world it knew and did not elaborate theoretical systems on different bases which might never exist. It is, therefore, now engaged in profoundly modifying the old structures to meet these new conditions. Formerly it assumed, quite properly, a considerable degree of fluid or competitive adjustment in the response of factors of production to the stimulus or operation of price, which was really a theory of value-equilibrium. Whereever equilibrium was disturbed, the disturbance released forces tending to restore it. To-day many of the factors formerly free are relatively fixed, such as wage levels, prices, market quotas, and when an external impact at some point strikes the organism, instead of the effect being absorbed throughout the system by adjustments of all the parts, it now finds the shock evaded or transmitted by many of them, leaving the effects to be felt most severely at the few remaining points of free movement or accommodation. Unemployment is one of these. The extent to which this fact throws a breaking strain upon those remaining free points is not completely analysed, and the new economics of imperfect competition is not fully written out or absorbed. The delicate mechanism of price adjustment with the so-called law of supply and demand governed the whole movement, but with forcible fixation of certain price elements consequences arise in unexpected and remote quarters. Moreover, the search for a

communally planned system to secure freedom from maladjustments involves a new economics in which the central test of price must be superseded by a statistical mechanism and a calculus of costs which has not yet been satisfactorily worked out for a community retaining *some* freedom of individual action and choice. The old international currency equilibrated world forces and worked its way into internal conditions in order to do so. But the modern attempt to prevent any internal effect of changes in international trade, or to counteract them, and the choice of internal price stability at all costs against variable international economic equations, has set economic science a new structure to build out of old materials. At this moment when elasticity is most wanted, stability leading to rigidity becomes a fetish. The aftermath of war is the impossibility of organising society for peace.

The impact of economic science upon society to-day is intense and confusing, because, addressing itself to the logic of various sets of conditions as the likely or necessary ones according to its exponents, predilections, it speaks with several voices, and the public are bewildered. Unlike their claims upon physics and mathematics, since it is dealing with money, wages, and employment, the things of everyday, they have a natural feeling that it ought to be easily understandable and its truth recognisable. Balfour once said, in reference to Kant, 'Most people prefer a problem which they cannot explain, to an explanation which they cannot understand.' But in the past twenty years, the business world and the public have become economics-conscious, and dabble daily in index numbers of all kinds, and the paraphernalia of foreign exchange and statistics of economic life. The relativity of economic principle to national psychology baffles the economists themselves, for it can be said truly at one and the same time, for example, that confidence will be best secured by balancing the Budget, and by not balancing it, according to public mentality. The economics of a community not economically self-conscious are quite different from those of a people who watch every sign and act accordingly. Thus the common notion that economics should be judged by its ability to forecast (especially to a particular date) is quite fallacious, for the prophecy, if 'true' and believed, must destroy itself, inasmuch as the economic conduct involved in the forecast is different after the forecast from what it would have been before. The paradox is just here, for example: if a people are told that the peak of prices in a commodity will actually be on June 10, they will all so act that they anticipate the date and destroy it. Economics, thoroughly comprehended, can well foretell the effects of a tendency, but hardly ever the precise date or amount of critical events in those effects. The necessity for a concentration upon new theoretical and analytical analysis, and upon realistic research is very great. But so also is the need for widespread and popular teaching. For a single chemist or engineer may by his discovery affect the lives of millions who enter into it but do not understand it, whereas a conception in economic life however brilliant, generally requires the conformity of the understanding and wills of a great number before it can be effective.

But not alone economics: if the impact of science brings certain evils they can only be cured by more science. Ordered knowledge and principles are wanted at every point. Let us glance at three only, in widely different fields: man's work, man's health, man's moral responsibility. The initial impact of new science is in the factory itself. The kind of remedy required here is covered by the work of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. Some of this improves upon past conditions, some creates the conditions of greater production, but much of it combats the evils arising from new conditions created by modern demands, speed, accuracy and intensity. It invokes the aid of many branches of science. It is the very first point of impact. Yet its finance is left to personal advocacy, and commands not 10 per cent. of the expenditure on research in artificial silk, without which the world was reasonably happy for some centuries. We can judge of the scope of this by the reports of the Industrial Health Research Board. Again, the scientific ancillaries of medicine have made immense strides. Clinical medicine as an art makes tardy, unscientific and halting use of them. The public remain as credulous as ever, their range of gullibility widened with every pseudo-scientific approach. (We do not know what proportion of positive cases can create the illusion of a significant majority in mass psychology, but I suspect that it is

often as low as twenty per cent.) For a considerable range of troubles inadequately represented in hospitals, the real experience passes through the hands of thousands of practitioners, each with too small a sample to be statistically significant, and is, therefore, wasted from a scientific standpoint. Half-verified theroies run riot as medical fashions, to peter out gradually in disillusionment. If the scattered cases were all-centralised through appropriately drawn case-histories, framed by a more scientifically trained profession, individual idiosyncrasy would cancel out, and mass scrutiny would bring the theories to a critical statistical issue of verification or refutation in a few months. This would be to the advantage of all society, and achieve an even greater boon in suggesting new points for central research.

A suggestion has been made for an inventions clearing house, to 'co-operate the scientific, social and industrial phases of Invention, and to reduce the lag between invention and application' managed by a committee of scientists and a committee of industrialists and bankers. The proposal came to me from New York, but London was to be the home of the organisation, which was to adopt a code of ethics in the interests of inventors, industry and *social progress*. This brings me to my third example, the field of ethics, which needs the toil of new thought. The systems of to-day, evolving over two thousand years, are rooted in individualism and the relations between individuals. But the relations of society to-day are not predominantly individual, for it is permeated through and through with corporate relations of every kind. Each of these works over some delegated area of the individual's choice of action, and evolves a separate code for the appropriate relationship. The assumption that ethical questions are decided by processes which engage the individual's whole ethical personality is no longer even remotely true. The joint-stock company may do something, or refrain from doing something, on behalf of its shareholders, which is a limited field of ethics, and may but faintly resemble what they would individually do with all other considerations added to their financial interests. The whole body of ethics needs to be reworked in the light of modern corporate relations, from Church and company, to cadet corps and the League of Nations.

In no case need we glorify change: but true rest may be only ideally controlled motion. The modern poet says:

> 'The endless cycle of idea and action,
> Endless invention, endless experiment,
> Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness.'

But so long as we are to have change—and it seems inevitable—let us master it. T. S. Eliot goes on:

> 'Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?'

My predecessors have spoken of the shortcomings of the active world—to me they are but the fallings short of science. Wherever we look we discover that if we are to avoid trouble we must take trouble—scientific trouble. The duality which puts science and man's other activity in contrasted categories with disharmony to be resolved, gaps to be bridged, is unreal. We are simply beholding ever-extending science too rough round the edges as it grows.

What we have learnt concerning the proper impact of science upon society in the past century is trifling, compared with what we have yet to discover and apply. We have spent much and long upon the science of matter, and the greater our success the greater must be our failure, unless we turn also at long last to an equal advance in the science of man.