confined to merely reporting the occurrence of phosphorites; it is much broader scientifically. In this initial report we have attempted to highlight the prospects and scientific issues associated with the phosphorites off Chennai. While discussing the scientific results we have given due importance to Vaz's work on index fossils and brought out the implications of palaeogeography of the eastern margin of India on the formation of phosphorites. This interpretational aspect was not presented by Vaz himself from his results. In conclusion we wish to state that of

course we are aware and acknowledge that G. G. Vaz et al were the first to find and report the phosphorites off Chennai. If it is felt that we should have given more prominence to his work, we do so now. But the point of issue is that we have acknowledged his work, enlarged on it, and hope to continue detailed investigations on the samples collected, the results of which will be published in the near future. As a gesture of fellowship we invite G. G. Vaz and his group to jointly analyse the samples with us, in the hope of synergizing

joint collaborations of Indian marine geologists.

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NEWS

Following Shakti '98 US details tighter controls on the export to India of dual-use goods

The extra-territorial application of a domestic US law was triggered when, days after the Shakti '98 nuclear tests in May, the US President 'determined and reported' to the US Congress, under the authority of Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (the Glenn amendment), that the Indian activities had 'violated the Act'. On June 22, under the provisions of the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) elaborated the implementation of a tighter US export control policy for India as follows (in which 'reexport' means export of USmade items from third countries).

For nuclear and missile-related items (i.e. things, technology and software exported from the US) and Indian entities of concern (i.e. purchasing organizations, laboratories, projects, companies):

- BXA will deny all export and reexport applications for dual-use items controlled for nuclear or missile nonproliferation reasons under the Export Administration Regulations to all end users in India.
- Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), BXA will publish a list of Indian government and private

entities involved in nuclear and missile activities. All exports and reexports of all items subject to the EAR will be prohibited to these listed entitles.

For national-security related items and Indian military entities, BXA will:

- For computers: control the export and reexport of computers over 2000 MTOPS and require an export licence for all exports of these computers to India regardless of end-use or end-user. All applications for computers above 2000 MTOPS for Indian government entities involved in nuclear, missile, or non-government entities supporting India's nuclear or missile programmes will be reviewed with a presumption of denial. Licence applications to other end-users will be favourably considered on a case-by-case basis.
- publish a list of Indian government entities involved in military activities, and will require a licence, reviewed with a presumption of denial, for all controlled US-origin dual-use items (i.e. goods, technology, or software listed in Part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations) with the exception of common use items (those under category EAR99).
- continue to review applications on a

case-by-case basis for exports and reexports to non-government entities in India (i.e. private-sector companies, academic institutions) currently producing items for the military.

For other dual-use items:

- BXA will 'continue to give favourable consideration' on a case-by-case basis to other dual-use export and reexport licence applications to other Indian government and non-government entities.
- BXA will now process all pending licences based on the above criteria. It has reminded exporters of the requirements of the US Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), including their responsibility to 'know their customers' and to seek a licence for any export or reexport when exporters 'know' or 'have reason to know' that the export or reexport will be used in prohibited activities.

So if you are researching enhancing virility in Ladakh stud Yaks in Leh military farms, check-out BXA's website http://www.bxa.gov every time your repeat orders for 'Viagra – animal application – sample' is held up somewhere in Arizona.